Witryna1 kwi 1975 · (1) r A signalling equilibrium is said to exist if there is a profile of wage offers w (y) which is (partially) self-confirming. That is, net income maximizing individuals choose an education y = y (n) such that actual productivity s, determined only ex-post, is equal to the wage offered. Witryna1 gru 2011 · The quality of a product is not known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price-signaling competition. There are two regimes...
Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling - Research Papers …
Witryna"Imperfect competition and quality signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183, March. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. " Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling ," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0520, Vanderbilt University … Witrynaacknowledge the potentially key role of quality within competition enforcement, few agencies have as yet succeeded in incorporating systematically the assessment of quality within their competition analytical processes. Product quality, alongside price, is a key determination of competition in many if not most markets. cynthia loftis
Signaling Quality Through Prices in an Oligopoly - Research …
WitrynaHow does the need to signal quality through price affect equilibrium pricing and profits, when a firm faces a similarly-situated rival? In this paper, we provide a model of non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers. ... "Imperfect competition and quality signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, … Witryna1 lut 2015 · Competition, Disclosure and Signalling M. Janssen, Santanu Roy Published 1 February 2015 Business, Economics Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Journal Competition creates strategic incentives for firms to communicate private information about product quality through signalling rather than voluntary disclosure. WitrynaAbstract. I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. … cynthia loescher